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Abstract. Quantum theory is a tremendously successful physical theory, but nev-
ertheless suffers from two serious problems: the measurement problem and the
problem of interpretational underdetermination. The latter, however, is largely
overlooked as a genuine problem of its own. Both problems concern the doctrine
of realism, but pull, quite curiously, into opposite directions. The measurement
problem can be captured such that due to scientific realism about quantum theory
common sense anti-realism follows, while theory underdetermination usually counts
as an argument against scientific realism. I will also consider the more refined dis-
tinctions of ontic and epistemic realism and demonstrate that quantum theory in its
most viable interpretations conflicts with at least one of the various realism claims.
A way out of the conundrum is to come to the bold conclusion that quantum theory
is, possibly, wrong (in the realist sense).
1 Introduction
Quantum theory (QT) is presumably the most successful theory in the history of physics
ever. It provides the broad theoretical framework for constructive model theories like
quantum electrodynamics or solid state quantum mechanics, and its various theoretical
predictions are as impressive as for instance the precise calculation of the anomalous
magnetic dipole moment of the electron within an accuracy of 10−8. It’s perhaps even
more instructive to illustrate the success of QT by pointing out that about one third of
the gross national product of the US is based directly or indirectly on developments of
QT.
Nevertheless, QT suffers from two serious problems: the quantum measurement problem
and the problem of interpretational underdetermination, and both problems concern the
philosophical doctrine of realism. Curiously, and as far as the issue of realism is concerned,
the two problems pull into opposite directions. The measurement problem can be captured
such that if we are scientific realists about QT common sense anti-realism follows, while
theory underdetermination usually counts as an argument against scientific realism. This
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reflects more than just a superficial philosophical tension, it reflects the deep conceptual
problems of QT. In fact, the problems are deep enough to come to the conclusion that
quantum theory is possibly wrong. And this is the overall thesis I will argue for in the
paper.
The paper will be organized as follows. In the second section I will present the quantum
measurement problem and emphasize the points I consider to be important. The third
section is devoted to the general issue of theory underdetermination and its particular
relevance and application to the interpretational debate of QT. In section four the doctrine
of realism will be deployed in its various relevant distinctions of common sense realism
and scientific realism as well as the ontic/epistemic divide (section 5). I will balance and
discuss the six most prominent interpretations of QT with regard to the different realism
variants. It turns out that QT in any of the considered viable interpretations conflicts
with at least one of the realism variants. In the final section I will ask what’s so special
about QT. The point I want to make is that it is the only theory in science which leads,
according to the measurement problem, to a serious attack on common sense realism and
which at the same time provides the most catchy case study for the otherwise debatable
issue of theory underdetermination. The final conclusion that quantum theory is possibly
wrong follows as a natural but nevertheless astonishing consequence from our foregoing
discussion.
2 The Quantum Measurement Problem
The quantum measurement problem (QMP) is by far the most intricate sting in the
quantum business. Loosely speaking, QMP arises from that fact that there is no unitary
transition
|φ〉 =
∑
i
αi|φi〉 9 |φk〉 (1)
with probability pi = |αi|2 (Born’s rule). Quantum states are generally construed as
superpositions (lhs), while measurement outcomes appear to be definite results (rhs).
Some of the most comprehensive analyses of the problem of measurement in QT can be
found in the lifework of Peter Mittelstaedt (1963, 1998), the following exposition is very
much inspired by his work. Consider a measurement apparatus A and object system S
with corresponding states |a〉 and |s〉. To perform a measurement, the systems A and S
must be coupled. Formally, one considers the compound states |φ〉 in the tensor product
HS ⊗ HA of the Hilbert spaces HS and HA. The physical coupling itself is represented
by the dynamics
|φ′〉 = eiHˆt |φ〉 (2)
of the measurement interaction Hˆ. It follows from linearity that for a general initial state
of the measured system we get entangled states
|φ′〉 =
∑
i,k
cik|a′i ⊗ s′k〉. (3)
The Schmidt decomposition guarantees that there exists a representation such that |φ′〉 =∑
i
√
pi|a′i〉|s′i〉 with pi = |cii|2, nevertheless, |φ′〉 is a pure state of the compound system
A+ S.
Here, the measurement problem arises. The crucial point is that, after the measurement
coupling, systems A and S are no longer independent, and that therefore the states of
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the compound |φ〉 are not factorizable into the single system states |a〉 and |s〉. This is
the root of problem, since we expect from any measurement and measuring apparatus to
yield independent, definite pointer states. It is a precondition of any measurement that
the following premiss holds:
Central measurement premiss (CMP): The outcome of any measurement
process is given by definite pointer states.
It follows from the above that this premiss can generally not be fulfilled in QT. This is
(one way to spell out) the measurement problem.
The quantum measurement problem (QMP): Quantum theory is in
conflict with CMP, since it cannot reproduce definite measurement outcomes.
It has become standard to consider decoherence mechanisms in order to cope with QMP
(cf. Schlosshauer 2007). The idea is to embed the system A+S in a more realistic manner
into a bigger environment E , where the crucial assumption can be made that the states
of E are more or less uncorrelated
〈ei|ek〉 ≈ δik. (4)
The total state of the compound A+S + E may be written as |Φ〉 = ∑i
√
pi|a′i〉|s′i〉|e′i〉 or
as a density matrix ρ = |Φ〉〈Φ|. Under the decoherence assumption (4) the state of the
subsystem A+ S can be written as the reduced density matrix
ρred ≈
∑
i
pi|a′i〉〈a′i| ⊗ |s′i〉〈s′i|. (5)
Prima facie, this looks promsing, since due to decoherence the disturbing interference
terms have (almost) been deleted. It is, however, well known, that the reduced density
matrix ρred cannot be distinguished from a statistical ensemble of states |a′i〉|s′i〉 for all
practical purposes ! As d’Espagnat (1965) has dubbed it, ρred is an improper mixture, it
only appears as if a certain measurement result has been achieved.
Hence, decoherence alone cannot solve the measurement problem. It is instructive to
decompose QMP into a two-fold problem:
1. Singling out (the pointer basis as) a preferred basis system
2. Transformation of a pure into a non-pure state.
While decoherence offers an explanation to problem (1) and thereby nicely explains why
the actual world appears as classical, decoherence has no resources to solve (2). As John
Bell (1990) once put:
“The idea of elimination of coherence, in one way or another, implies the
replacement of ‘and’ by ‘or’, is a very common one among the solvers of the
‘measurement problem’. It has always puzzled me.”
QMP is therefore fresh and alive. And there are a few ways to express it. Here are
some corollaries:
• There exist no unitary mappings from pure states to mixed states.
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• Quantum measurements lead to improper mixtures only.
• Quantum state probabilities do not allow for an ignorance interpretation, they are
ontic probabilities.
• Quantum theory doesn’t provide its own measurement theory.
It should have become clear from the thus exposed nature of QMP that QT is truly
unique among all physical, or even among all scientific theories in the sense that no other
theory is plagued by such an intricate problem.
3 Quantum Theory Underdetermination
Scientific theories give us pictures of the world – pictures of the world beyond mere
collections of sense data and observations. Such ontological pictures are given to us if
we provide the theoretical formalism with an interpretation. While this is a common
theme for any scientific theory, and even more so, of course, for mathematically formal-
ized theories, quantum theory is unique in this respect, too. No other scientific theory
has ever been plagued in the same sense and to the same extent by the problem of giv-
ing an appropriate interpretation of the formalism. 80 years of QT have provided us
with a large variety of differing interpretations. Here’s a rough and ready list of just a
few common ones: instrumentalism, statistical (ensemble) interpretations, Copenhagen
interpretation, consciousness-caused collapse interpretations (a` la Wigner), many worlds
(a` la Everett), many minds, many histories, consistent histories, Bohmian mechanics,
spontaneous collapse theories (a` la Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber), transactional interpretation,
relational quantum mechanics, modal interpretations etc.
For the following let us pick out six interpretations out of the whole variety, but basically
pars pro toto. They are
1. Instrumentalism
2. Copenhagen interpretation
3. Many worlds
4. Bohmian interpretation
5. Consciousness-caused collapse interpretations
6. Spontaneous collapse theories (GRW)
These six interpretations give us drastically heterogeneous ontological pictures of the
world, but are, at the same time, empirically equivalent in the sense that they satisfy the
same corpus of observational data. At least, we can recast them in such a way that this
claim holds. In a slogan: they are empirically equivalent, but ontologically different.
In a sense GRW sticks out. GRW-like approaches do in fact change the mathematical
core of the formalism by adding a new additional piece, the collapse mechanism, to it.
Nevertheless GRW-like approaches can in principle be adjusted in such a way that they fit
the same data as interpretations 1-5. This at least works up to a point far beyond today’s
measuring accuracies. In this sense all six interpretations provide cases of empirically
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equivalent, but ontologically different variants of QT, and as such intriguing cases of
what philosophers of science call theory underdetermination by empirical evidence.
In short, the thesis of theory underdetermination (TUD) says the following:
TUD-Thesis: For any theory T and any body of observation O there ex-
ists another theory T’, such that T and T’ are empirically equivalent (but
ontologically different).
The main intuition behind TUD is that theory exceeds observation (T > O). Theories
are far more than mere collections of data or listings of outcomes of experiments, theories
introduce theoretical terms and lawlike connections between them, either as logical con-
nections or as empirically grounded regularities. It is the slack between T and O which,
in principle at least, allows for a multitude of ways to fit the data with theory. This basic
intuition behind TUD is beautifully captured in Quine’s words in his 1975 paper “On
empirically equivalent systems of the world”:
”If all observable events can be accounted for in one comprehensive scientific
theory–one system of the world...–, then we may expect that they can all be
accounted for equally in another, conflicting system of the world. We may
expect this because of how scientists work. For they do not resist with mere
inductive generalizations of their observations: mere extrapolations to observ-
able events from similar observed events. Scientists invent hypotheses that talk
of things beyond the reach of observation. The hypotheses are related to obser-
vation only by a kind of one-way implication; namely, the events we observe
are what a belief in the hypotheses would have led us to expect. These observ-
able consequences of the hypotheses do not, conversely, imply the hypotheses.
Surely there are alternative hypothetical substructures that would surface in the
same observable ways. Such is the doctrine that natural science is empirically
under-determined ... by all observable events.”
In the debate about scientific realism, TUD is usually considered as one of the
strongest objections to the realist position (besides the equally infamous pessimistic meta-
induction). It is also important to notice that TUD is a particularly strong claim. This
becomes clear if we compare it with neighboring, though not equivalent claims. For in-
stance, TUD should not be confused with Duhemian holism – the claim that there is no
experimentum crucis, that no scientific hypothesis can be tested in isolation, but only
theories as a whole. According to such confirmational holism it is possible to adhere to
any thesis in the face of adverse observations by revising other theses. Only whole theories
are subject to confirmation. Surely there is only a small gap to TUD, since we may very
well generate rivaling theories by readjusting the total system of hypotheses. According
to TUD, however, even the total system cannot be confirmed, but is underdetermined by
all possible observations.
To emphasize that TUD speaks about underdetermination by all possible observations
shows the difference to the induction problem, sometimes dubbed as Humean underde-
termination. The induction problem is induced by underdetermination of theory by past
evidence, while TUD considers underdetermination even in the case of all possible (past
and future) observations.
As a strong claim, TUD is by far not uncontroversial. The most pressing problem
with TUD as a convincing objection to scientific realism is the perplexing fact that there
doesn’t seem to exist that many convincing cases. In fact, given the generality of TUD
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as stated in the philosophy literature one would assume that practising scientists suffer
seriously from it. One would assume that science in practice is notoriously stymied by
the appearance of rivaling theories, that scientists always have to cope with conflicting
theoretical models. But that doesn’t seem to be the case – certainly not as far as physics
is concerned. By and large, science seems to be conservative and calm. This is what we
might call the problem of missing examples (Lyre 2009).
As we’ve seen from the above, however, the interpretational debate in quantum theory
is a counterexample. The plethora of rivaling quantum interpretations provides us with
the perhaps only convincing TUD case in physics. Call this QTUD: the underdetermi-
nation of quantum theory by empirical evidence as displayed in the multitude of rivaling
interpretations.
4 Common sense realism and scientific realism
TUD is a threat to scientific realism. Scientific realism, in turn, is a particular realist
doctrine. It is the doctrine that the theoretical terms in our best and mature scientific
theories refer. It is therefore a claim about the unobservable. By way of contrast, common
sense realism is the claim that the things in our directly observable, common sensical world
around us exist. Common sense realism is about tables and chairs, while scientific realism
concerns theoretical entities like electrons or black holes. Let us, for the sake of clarity,
capture the two doctrines in brief:
Common sense realism (CSR): There exists a world of everyday (“meso-
scopic”) and concrete, particular entities such as tables, chairs, animals, hu-
mans, trees, mountains, the sky etc.
Scientific realism (SciR): The theoretical terms in our best and mature
scientific theories refer.
Obviously, in discussions about realism one must be careful about the divide between
common sense realism and scientific realism, since it simply makes an important differ-
ence whether we talk about tables and chairs or theoretical entities. And what is more:
scientific anti-realists may very well be (and usually are!) common sense realists. We
may even say that science in general is actually committed to common sense realism.
The reason for this commitment simply lies in the fact that scientific experimentation
and theorizing presupposes belief in the reality of our everyday, mesoscopic world. It
is more than obvious that disbelief in the reality of our laboratories, measuring devices
and pointer states doesn’t even get the scientific enterprise off the ground. And this, in
turn, means that scientific realism presupposes or includes common sense realism. Let us
capture this in the following way:
SciR ⊃ CSR (6)
In the light of the quantum measurement problem, however, the existence of definite
states and hence the independent and objective existence of objects represented by such
states is undermined. There is, furthermore, no restriction about the realm of objects
described by quantum theory, QT is generally thought to be universally applicable. Thus,
QMP is a threat to realism in toto, it in fact threatens CSR:
QMP ⊃ ¬CSR (7)
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And this is quite remarkable, since QT really turns out to be special amongst scientific
theories in this respect: it is the only scientific theory that threatens CSR! We may con-
sider this as another, more informal way to spell out the quantum measurement problem.
5 Realism and quantum interpretations
The various quantum interpretations offer various ways to cope with the measurement
problem. For instance: Bohm – by assuming hidden variables, many worlds – by as-
suming many worlds, and GRW – by assuming additional collapses. But here we do not
want to ask whether the QT variants succeed in solving QMP, but rather ask: do these
interpretations stick with CSR? More generally: how do the various QT-interpretations
stick with either common sense realism or scientific realism about QT, SciR(QT)? The
following table might give a first, rough overview:
CSR SciR(QT)
Instrumentalism + -
Copenhagen - +
Bohm + +
Many worlds - +
Wigner - +
GRW + +
The first line is straightforward: instrumentalists are scientific anti-realists, but are at
the same time (or may at least be) common sense realists. Proponents of the Copenhagen
interpretation take QT seriously, not only as a tool, but as telling us something about
the world. They do, however, reserve a special role for observers or measuring devices or
conceive a classical/quantum divide. In short: SciR(QT) yes, CSR no. The same is true
for many world proponents, who assume, quite contrary to common sense, a branching of
worlds into many copies, and Wignerians, who refer to a mind-body-dualism.
While 4 of 6 interpretations violate some form of realism, Bohm and GRW do not. But
we must be more careful in our usage of the term realism and distinguish at least between
ontic and epistemic variants of realism. For the purpose of our discussion this distinction
is particulary relevant in the case of scientific realism.
Ontic SciR: The theoretical entities in our best and mature scientific theories
exist independently (from our epistemic and linguistic capacities).
Epistemic SciR: Science conveys true knowledge about theoretical entities.
Under these refined definitions the preceding table must be enlarged in the following
way:
CSR OSciR(QT) ESciR(QT)
Instrumentalism + - -
Copenhagen - + -
Bohm + + -
Many worlds - + +
Wigner - + -
GRW + + +
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Under the refined definitions the Bohmian approach also violates a form of realism,
ESciR, since Bohmians build their approach on the assumption of epistemically hidden
variables. It seems that, in the end, only GRW conforms to all realistic assumptions.
However, we should not forget the very special nature of GRW-like approaches as already
indicated in section 3. GRW adds an explicit new mechanism to QT, the collapse mecha-
nism. Without going into details, such a mechanism typically depends on new parameters
specifying the localization accuracy and the mean frequency of the stochastic spontaneous
collapses. The collapse parameters are put in by hand such that the predictions of the
model conform to the experimental outcomes. They are ad hoc, but this may be consid-
ered an aesthetic stain of GRW only. The deeper problem is that it seems in principle
always possible to bring GRW approaches in accordance with observation by suitable
readjustments of the collapse parameters. GRW provides therefore an all-too obvious
case of Duhemian holism: the readjustment procedure can be used to make GRW auto-
immune to any falsification (at least up to a point beyond today’s measuring accuracy, as
already mentioned in section 3).
Obviously, if true, this is no good science. And if this is the price to pay for realism
then realism becomes a mute point. Let us therefore concentrate on interpretations 1
to 5 only. Under this restriction, the upshot of this section is that quantum theory in
its most viable interpretations conflicts with at least one of the various realism claims.
Besides GRW with its contentious setting, there seems to be no hope to reconcile QT
with a full-blown realism: CSR + OSciR(QT) + ESciR(QT).
6 What’s so special about quantum theory?
Section 4 ended with the result (7) that QMP threatens CSR, and we have considered
this as an informal way to spell out QMP. We also saw that QT is special among scientific
theories since it is the only scientific theory that threatens CSR (at least to this extent).
On closer inspection, however, this is a weird result, since in order to believe in QT we
have to be scientific realists first! Our result from section 4 says that scientific realism
about quantum theory, SciR(QT), “infects” common sense realism
SciR(QT ) ⊃ QMP ⊃ ¬CSR. (8)
On the other hand, from (6), SciR in general already includes CSR. Thus, in a sense, (6)
and (8) ’contradict’ each other. This may not be a strict logical contradiction, but there
is certainly something strange going on here.
So let’s try over. QT is special. It is special because it suffers not only from QMP but
from two serious problems: QMP and QTUD.
Some will argue that both problems are connected, and that’s perhaps true. But if
so, how are they connected? Is the measurement problem an aftereffect of QTUD? This
seems largely implausible. Theory underdetermination, the general fact that there exist
ontologically different but empirically equivalent rivals, does not lead in any logical or
conceptual sense to a particular, concrete problem like QMP. So QTUD ⊃ QMP is quite
unlikely. But the reverse,
QMP ⊃ QTUD, (9)
is by no means inconceivable.
Notice first that, even if we assume the two problems QMP and QTUD to be connected,
they seem to pull into opposite directions. We saw that the measurement problem can
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be captured such that, according to (8), if we are scientific realists about QT, common
sense anti-realism follows, while theory underdetermination usually counts as an argument
against scientific realism, hence TUD ⊃ ¬SciR. In the case of quantum theory, however,
scientific realism amounts to taking the measurement problem seriously: SciR(QT ) ⊃
QMP , compare again (8). Combining this, we get the curious chain
QMP ⊃ QTUD ⊃ ¬SciR(Q) ⊃ ¬QMP. (10)
Again, this looks weird. And even if our rather informal notation ”⊃” doesn’t mean strict
logical implication, we must somehow break the chain of arguments at a certain point to
avoid the contradictory flavor in all this. Is there a possible way out of the conundrum?
Let’s go back to (9), which we used as a conceivable assumption in our argument. Why
is it conceivable? QMP, or so one might argue, points to a deep-seated inconsistency
or fallacy within quantum theory. And if that’s true, QT must basically be considered
an incomplete and scientifically underdeveloped framework. It is therefore by no means
astonishing that we can cook up so many rivaling interpretations for QT, in the light of
this consideration they simply appear as an outspring of incomplete scientific knowledge.
However, this means that QTUD is presumably not the genuine case of TUD we mis-
took it for. We should not expect incomplete theoretical frameworks completely to be
interpretable. We must, on the contrary, expect such frameworks to allow for an open-
ended multitude of conflicting interpretations. And even if the inference (9) cannot be
made strongly, QTUD is certainly ”triggered” by QMP to a considerable extent.
This line of reasoning also offers a potential answer to the question, why QTUD appears
to be the only half-way convincing case of TUD in physics as pointed out in 3: TUD should
be omnipresent, but there is a problem of missing TUD examples instead. The reason
might simply be that it takes a conceptual problem in science as deep as QMP to “trigger”
rivaling frameworks. Without such a problem they practically never appear.
Of course we can understand this either epistemically or ontologically. Under an epis-
temic reading the claim only is that the rivaling frameworks do not come to light, but
that they nevertheless exist. Under an ontological reading they only exist because of the
previously existing conceptual difficulties. The latter option is perhaps more plausible.
At least for the practice of science the idea of Quinean TUD seems to be overdrawn. Prac-
tical cases of TUD, which are rare events anyhow, should not be considered as genuine
TUD cases in the strong Quinean sense, but rather as indicators of incomplete scientific
knowledge (cf. Lyre and Eynck, 2003). Under this supposition QTUD isn’t genuine as
well, but an artefact of conceptual incompleteness. And this means that we must seriously
envisage the conclusion that quantum theory is possibly wrong.
Let me finally remark that this conclusion is of course as vague as many of the as-
sumptions made along the way. To say that QT is wrong is meant here in the naive
correspondence sense: the theoretical terms of a wrong theory simply do not refer. To say
that QT is possibly wrong indicates that I’m fully aware of the contentious nature of some
of my assumptions. Nevertheless, I think it is useful to throw light on old questions, the
conundrum of QMP, from a somewhat different and largely overlooked angle, the question
of QTUD. But surely, to claim that QT is possibly wrong is a bold claim, since QT is so
tremendously successful. The debate about quantum realism is still open.
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